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As new technologies develop, new questions for ethics and social policy are generated.  As our understanding of the consequences of human action changes, we need to revise our view on how to implement the values we hold.  
What is most worrying about the present discourse is the near exclusion of an open scientific debate with clearly stated arguments. The arguments are highly emotional and fed by motives which are far removed from the actual issues on biotechnology. Diverse organisations use the debate for increasing their political influence without any useful result for the population. A democratic process functioning in a enlightened atmosphere seems a pipe dream​[1]​. 

There is a complex web of issues surrounding the development and use of scientific knowledge in crafting policies that satisfy our sometimes-conflicting desires and interests. Our assessment of the promises and perils of genomics in the 21st century involves the desire to preserve the biosphere so that human life can continue, to meet our moral obligations to the lives that populate the planet today by improving health and eliminating famine, to promote freedom and democracy as well as to increase our knowledge of the nature of nature.

In this paper, I will investigate how the complexities of biology and of human values impinge on the means by which we can create sensible policies about genomics.  I will consider this issue not from a scientific point of view, but from a philosophical perspective.  My past research has been focussed on the implications of biological complexity on epistemological issues.​[2]​ That is, if complex systems (like organisms, or social insect colonies, or ecosystems) engage multiple, interacting (and not always linearly related) causal factors, then how should our scientific models and explanations represent that complexity?  Philosophers of science have tended to look at physics and its search for the four fundamental laws to understand science in general.   For the biological sciences the reduction of our knowledge to a few simple laws is not credible.  I have defended an alternative picture of scientific practice, namely what I have called integrative pluralism.  Multiple theories, models and explanations are generated for the variety of causal processes operative in complex, biological systems.   However, in the effort to explain a particular, local, and concrete event, these multiple approaches must be integrated to account for the singular combination of causes and historical circumstances responsible for that event.

Acknowledging complexity in nature has implications not just for our scientific theories and explanations, but also for the content of and means by which we make rational policy decisions about interventions into that complexity.  I will explore two different domains of complexity and describe how they impact our deliberations.  Formulating rational policy requires two types of input.  The first is the value that agents want to promote by a policy – what are we trying to accomplish with a policy concerning genetic modifications of plants and animals?  To this question there may be a variety of answers, including the increased quality of health of our citizens, the protection of the environment for future generations, the elimination of poverty and starvation in the world.  The other input is the set of facts that describe the consequences of the alternative actions considered.  What will happen if we increase the agricultural yield of rice or the rate of growth for farmed salmon by genetic means? What are the implications if we don’t do these things?  What will happen if we transform goats into bio-factories for the production of pharmaceutical products?   

At a more general policy level we might rightly investigate what are the consequences of introducing a ban on human cloning, or on genetically modified food?  What are the consequences of no regulations for their development and production, or the consequences for any of a number of types of regulation that could be introduced?   The logic is that if we know what we want (our values) and we know what we get if we adopt different actions (the facts) then we are in a position to know what we should do, how we should proceed.  Do a cost/benefit analysis and maximize your values.  It seems pretty simple.  However, this simple account of a policy decision masks two sorts of complexities that muddy the waters.  Not surprisingly the two sources correspond to the two types of input.  That is, sources of uncertainty for policy derive from first, the complexity of biological systems and second, from the pluralism of values held by agents for whom and by whom the policy is made.

Let’s look first at the complexity of the causal structures of biological systems that preclude simple, sound bite accounts of the consequences of genetic interventions.  For example, the most widely used transgenic pest-protected plants express insecticidal proteins derived from the bacterium Bacillus Thuringiensis (Bt).  Used in corn, potatoes and cotton, Bt GMO’s are often thought of as a single intervention.  But Bt toxins vary genetically and biochemically​[3]​.  Furthermore, the consequences of the use of Bt plants vary in their environmental impact on other organisms and wild types and with their pesticide reducing benefits.  Replacing regular corn with Bt corn provides insect resistance, but does not modify the use of externally applied chemicals since these are generally not used for the job Bt does for corn. The use of Bt potatoes, however, does reduce the amount of pesticide required for healthy crops​[4]​.  So what sort of policy should be adopted for Bt plants? Bt potatoes are successful at resisting a variety of beetles. Their use can reduce the need for as much externally applied chemical insecticide as currently used.  Yet the genetic modification may also have consequences for non-target insects or induce an escalation in adaptations to evolve nonresistant parasites or have pleitropic effects on the modified plant itself or the landscape of genetic diversity in the wild, etc. etc.  The waves of consequent effects are not only broad, but at least some of the interactions with intricately connected parts of the ecosystem are still unknown. Indeed, the consequences for the same genomic strategy for different agricultural plants are different, say for corn or potatoes, so that even if we understood all the implications in the case of potatoes, it would not all apply directly to cases of corn or cotton. 

Even in this brief excursion into the consequences of genetic modification, we can detect two types of uncertainly on the fact side of the policy equation that arise from biological complexity.  These two sources of uncertainty have differing import for policy.  The first is the uncertainty of the cascading effects of interventions on the features of the ecosystem (including on human beings in terms of toxins and allergens) that we can specify and of which we have some understanding.  These include consequences for the known non-target species that interact with the transgenic organisms, and the wild species and could interbreed with the transgenic organisms. Because we don’t know precisely what the consequences of widespread release of transgenic organisms would be, it is difficult to assign a precise probability to the risk of these consequences.  More research will improve our understanding and correspondingly our assessment of the real risks involved.  

However, there is a second type of biological complexity, namely the consequences on what Norman Myers calls the “unknown unknowns”.​[5]​  Myers recounts our recent experience of becoming aware of the degradation of the environment due to global warming, only after the damage was done.  What we did had dire effects we were not aware of at the time.  Given the chaotic nature of some environmental interactions, where harmful effects can be amplified, irreversible and unpredictable in principle, there will be a class of consequences to which we could never assign a quantitative risk measurement.  Indeed, once the process has begun, it may be impossible to recover from the harm.

We cannot simply plug in probabilities for some of the consequences of genetic interventions whether they are known or unknown.  How, then, do we deal with these types of factual uncertainty in making sensible policy decisions?

1. Acknowledge and manage the known risks. Policy makers would like neat, certain answers to questions of risk so that an easily enforceable policy can be made.  However, for the reasons given above, fixed probability assignments cannot reflect our scientific knowledge in these situations.  We cannot pretend that there is certainty when there is not - and we cannot hold out for certainty when it is not going to be found. In an interview in March 2000, Edwin Rhodes, aquaculture coordinator for the National Marine Fisheries Service, said he was surprised to hear that the Food and Drug Administration was overseeing the environmental review regarding the new, genetically modified salmon that has an introduced foreign gene that keeps its growth hormone continually rather than cyclically operant.   Mr. Rhodes said the National Marine Fisheries Service, not the Food and Drug Administration, had the expertise to make decisions on such things as whether fish would be grown in net pens. "We have to have absolute certainty that transgenic fish do not interact with wild stocks," Mr. Rhodes said.​[6]​
We will never have certainty - to make our policy depend on it is a mistake.
2.  Continue to investigate the unknown consequences on known factors such as human allergies, non-target species, non-targeted phenotypic expression etc.  Since this will be an ongoing process of discovery - we need to be in a position to update our policy relative to what we discover.  This is in stark contrast to other environmental policy commitments, like the ‘no surprises” clause in the Multiple Species Conservation Program that is being implemented in San Diego county and heralded as a model for the entire country​[7]​.  There the rule is that once an agreement is made between local government and developers on what lands are to be set aside, nothing that may be discovered in the future can overturn that decision. This type of policy, though perhaps optimal from the developers’ point of view, does not reflect the type of scientific process involved in understanding endangered and threatened species and their habitats.  Rather, the current uncertainty combined with the incremental and fallible knowledge gained with continued scientific investigation require us to develop “adaptive management”.​[8]​  We need to update, overturn, and amend particular decisions as our knowledge of the consequences changes.
3.  For the “unknown unknowns”, if there is reason to suspect that the environmental harm will be great and irreversible, then a precautionary stance is appropriate.  Article 15 of the Biodiversity Convention states:
In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by states according to their capabilities.  Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.  

This principle is lauded by environmentalists who fear the possible, though unproven, damaging effects on the environment of new technologies.  It is simultaneously dismissed by those who take it as an unjustified prohibition to innovation​[9]​.  

The intent of the Precautionary Principle was to shift the legal burden of proof from regulators having to prove with “full scientific certainty” that harm would be done in order to ban a procedure, to those who want to introduce something new.  Under the principle, the innovators might have their products prohibited unless there is “full scientific certainty” that no harm could be done. Interpreting the principle with an emphasis on the proof of harm or proof of no harm, invokes a type of positivism that is entirely unwarranted.  Given the nature of the complexity that I have described, there can be no scientific certainty either way.  Rather than pass the burden of unattainable “proof” from one party to the other, we must acknowledge and manage the inescapable uncertainty.    By not adopting some transgenic practices that may not induce irreversible harm, we are at risk at not reaping the benefits of those technologies out of unjustifiable fear.  Just as by adopting a new technology that does issue in irreversible harm, we are risking the harmful consequence.  A precautionary approach is indicated by the nature of the possible harm.  If the possible harmful consequence is, as stated in the principle, both serious and irreversible, then clearly more caution is required than if it is minor and reversible.  But caution here, has to reflect the nature of the uncertainty.  It does not entail inaction; rather, it suggests a more flexible policy response than total ban or complete hands-off non-regulation.
	
How then can policy procedures take science seriously, when the science invokes uncertainty with respect to future consequences of new technologies?  A fixed policy – ban GMO’s for all time, is an inappropriate response to a dynamically growing scientific base of understanding.  If our policies are to reflect what we know about the world – as they should – and that knowledge is changing relatively rapidly, then our means for policy amendment should be sensitive to that dynamics.  If our policies are not so constructed, we will be stuck with the problem of having to decide once and for all on the basis of information that is ephemeral.  The alternative to a flexible management response, given the impermanence of our understanding, is to have policy ignore science altogether.  Since there is not a univocal accounting of the precise consequences of genetic interventions on the health, productivity, biodiversity, etc, a silencing of scientific input into policy is all to easy to ensue.  This would be a very bad thing.   Uncertain knowledge is still better than ignorance.

Uncertainties of the first type, i.e. the consequences on the known variables in a complex ecosystem, suggest a policy procedure that endorses continued investigation and is flexible enough to take into account our changing knowledge and adjust our actions appropriately. This will require close monitoring of new technologies with ongoing feedback from scientific analyses.  Monitoring itself is not easy, especially given the variety of genomic interventions and variability of local environmental impact​[10]​.  What is true for Bt corn is not true for Bt cotton.  

Other approaches to managing uncertainty in environmental policy have been proposed.  However, I believe they are inadequate to address the special circumstances of genetic modifications with potentially irreversible effects.  For example, Robert Costanza and Laura Cornwell suggested implementing what they call the 4P approach to scientific uncertainty.​[11]​  The four “P’s” stand for “precautionary polluter pays principle”.  The suggestion is to introduce an assurance bonding system that requires those that want to introduce a potentially harmful new product to make a commitment of resource up front to offset the potentially catastrophic future effects.  It is a flexible system in so far as portions of the bond would be returned if and when it can be demonstrated that the suspected worst-case damage has not occurred.

This economic approach shifts both the burden of proof and the cost of uncertainty from the general public to the agent who wants to introduce the new technology bypassing a need for specific safety standards to be established.  However, it seems to me that while this might work for harmful health consequences of introducing a new agent into the environment it is not clearly appropriate for the type of environmental consequences on biological diversity and ecosystem health at stake in the case of GMOs.  That is, for harmful health effects of a new product, the innovator can compensate the humans whose health is damaged.  But how much money would be required to offset the irreversible, cascading effects on the ecosystem.  Rather than go full steam ahead and just be prepared to pay up if there is harm, I think a slower, monitored pace with the option to stop if the harm is looking more probable is better fit to this situation.  Thus, where the harm is serious and irreversible, and where there is no current procedure for reducing the uncertainty, then a worst-case precautionary stance is the appropriate response.  

Let’s turn to the other half of the policy equation - the value input.  In a society that permits and endorses value pluralism, how can we proceed to generate fair policies that respect that diversity of views?  Again we can distinguish between two sorts of complexity – the first is constituted by the multiple values that any one individual or social group might consistently hold at one time and which cannot all be met in a given strategy, action or policy.  We want to improve the quality of our lives but we also want to preserve biological diversity for the future – sometimes an action that promotes one value is in opposition another value.  This is familiar territory for the ethicist.  Isaiah Berlin has stated:
…in ordinary experience … we are faced with choices between ends equally ultimate, and claims equally absolute, the realization of some of which must inevitably involve the sacrifice of others​[12]​ 

Moral conflict can be ameliorated if an individual can rank some values as more important than others, thus allowing a lexicographic decision procedure that follows the hierarchy. Plausibly medical health is seen to be more important than better tasting, cheaper or more environmentally noninvasive food.  I think most people do place health fairly high up in significance, which is probably why there is not much public outcry about genomics for pharmaceutical purposes but a lot about genetically modified food.  We try to satisfy as many of, or the most important moral values we hold and when we face a conflict we find resolution by analysis and ordering, by trading off the lesser values for the more significant ones. 

The second type of complexity concerns conflicts not among values held by an individual but among different people promoting conflicting values. The agents involved in making social policy concerning genetically modified foods and those affected by such policies may hold very different values that are fundamentally at odds. This type of deep moral conflict characterizes the debates on abortion, for example, where all parties may agree to all the same scientific facts but they have diametrically opposed interpretations of the moral significance of those facts.  

Stuart Hampshire’s conception of bare or procedural justice gives clues to how to manage this type of ethical complexity.  He suggests that the core concept for a fair or just outcome in such a situation is to require equal and fair dealing between proponents of rival conceptions of the good, i.e. it requires mutual respect.
 “...mutual respect seems to be necessary to keep open the possibility of resolving, on a moral basis, any significant dispute about public policy that involves fundamental moral conflict”  If citizens do not practice mutual respect as they try to come to agreement on a morally disputed policy, or as they try to live with the disagreement that remains after the disputed policy is adopted, they are forced to turn to nonmoral ways of dealing with moral conflict.  They are driven to count on procedural agreements, political deals, and threats of violence – all of which obviously stand in the way of moral deliberation.  The underlying assumption is that we should value reaching conclusions through reason rather than force, and more specifically through moral reasoning rather than through self-interested bargaining.  Nevertheless people holding such divergent moral values are still equal participants in a democratically structured decision process​[13]​.

Such deep differences are evident in the policy debates on transgenic foods. For example, some adopt the view that  “Nature and all that is natural is valuable and good in itself; all forms of biotechnology are unnatural in that they go against and interfere with Nature, particularly the crossing of natural species boundaries; all forms of modern biotech are therefore intrinsically wrong”​[14]​; or Prince Charles in reference to genetically modified food said  “I happen to believe that this kind of genetic modification takes mankind into realms that belong to God, and to God alone”.​[15]​  On the other side of the debate includes those who argue that only by using genetically modified foods will we be able to feed the third world, or treat vitamin A deficiency effectively. “If we value the ethic of ‘to each according to need’ … then the introduction of GM crops on a large scale would be a moral imperative. This is because GM crops might produce more food, or more employment income with which to obtain food, for those who need it most urgently. More food for the hungry, unlike tomatoes with a longer shelf-life, is a strong ethical counterweight to set against the concerns of the opponents of GM crops.”​[16]​  How could we made common cause between Prince Charles and Monsanto?

Although tolerance and respect acknowledge that there is room for many moral views, they do not entail that ANY view is to be considered.  In particular, some moral stances are based on confusion and one of the main philosophical tools for resolving moral disagreement is to clarify the views and the assumptions on which they rest in the hopes of moving positions closer together.

For example, the “crossing the species boundary is unnatural and thus immoral” argument is really at odds with our understanding of evolutionary process.  If you were to accept that position, you would also have to believe that the evolution of all new species was in some sense unnatural and immoral.  Since anyone would be hard pressed to reject all of the results of evolution this grounding for what is “natural” as a basis for what is morally permissible won’t hold up under scrutiny.

Even after screening out the inconsistent or confused positions, there will remain genuine moral differences that need to be acknowledged, and perhaps, accommodated.  There are well known problems with attempting to compare, measure, and resolve different valuations of goods or outcomes. Kenneth Arrow (​http:​/​​/​www.philosophypages.com​/​dy​/​a7.htm" \l "arro​) demonstrated formally that the collective preferences of groups cannot always be determined from the individual preferences of their members.​[17]​  Thus there is no algorithm for reaching consensus, but the reasoning is that if all internally consistent views are given a fair hearing – Hampshire’s bare procedural principle of justice - and we all agree that that process is a fair one, then the results of policy decisions from such a process should be acceptable - even if your side didn’t win this time.  

It well may be that there are moral differences among individuals which cannot, and even should not, be negotiated into some collective decision.  Even moral and political views that counsel tolerance find it unsavory to “tolerate” intolerance.  These “bottom line” differences will have to either find satisfaction in dividing the domains in which people can comfortably live, or by a political process.  However, it does not seem to be the case that the different moral stances participant in the debates on genetically modified food are of this character.  One indication is that there is very little objection to the use of genetic engineering in the production of medicines; while at the same time there is major public dismay at the use of genetic engineering in food products.  For most, the moral objection cannot be to every and all genetic technologies, and hence does not seem to fit the “bottom line” profile.  In that case, mediation and resolution may be possible.

There are steps we can take to encourage mediation among the diverse views concerning genetically modified foods.  The first step to accommodating moral pluralism are to let into the discussion the different moral stakeholders.  As we saw above, this is not anyone with a view, but anyone with a coherent, consistent, moral position. Thus there is a weeding out of the merely politically expedient, of those paying merely lip service to a view, but don’t act on the view, of those voicing one-issue slogans without accepting the consequences of that view.  Second, there are ways of framing disagreements that acknowledges moral conflict and ambiguity, while persevering our ability to continue to live together and make joint policy.
David Wong has articulated principles for achieving this. ​[18]​
1.	act on one’s moral position in a way that minimizes potential damage to one’s broader relationship to others who have opposed positions.
2.	Other things being equal, select issues that minimize opportunity for serious disagreement.  In this case, want to decide policies on a fairly specific, rather than general level.  If we pose the options as ban all GMO’s or have no regulation at all, there are greater chances of polarization and disagreement.  A case by case framework is dictated by the nature of the diversity and complexity of the consequences of different proposed interventions.
3.	adopt willingness to bridge differences.  This permits domains of agreement to be ascertained by removing the “us vs. them” attitude.  

How can we create an environment in which we can engage in scientifically informed, respectful dialog?  How to we reconfigure the debate to take account of both biological complexity and moral pluralism for policy decisions on GMO’s?  The current climate for decisions about genomic policy is teeming with hype, innuendo, and unbridled emotion.  This is clearly not a good situation for clear thinking.  Examples:
The reason that governments treat GMOs differently from other kinds of introduced organisms (like biocontrol agents or new garden plants) is because of fear and uncertainty.  Most of the fears are completely unjustified but not all... The worst way to deal with fear and uncertainty is by denial (.e.g. by saying that GMOs are just like any other organisms so there is nothing to be concerned about).  This is an example of what we might call the “trust me I’m a doctor syndrome.​[19]​ 

Evidence of distrust and disrespect for science abound in with the introduction of labels like “Frankenfish”​[20]​  By acknowledging and acting on a respect for all parties involved, one can hope to raise the level of the debate.  But that means there is responsibility on all sides.  First of all, citizens have to recognize the complexity of the scientific issues.  So too for policy makers, who also would prefer not only simple consequences but certainty, and if not certainty than at least accessibility to quantitative risk analysis.  We cannot demand proof and nothing but the proof in a context of biological complexity and uncertainty.  Rather, we have to develop adaptive policy mechanisms for management to take into account the scientific understanding of complex, irreversible processes.  In addition, scientists have an obligation to present to the public and to the policy makers that complexity, and to avoid sound-bite science.  In a context of political polarization and public distrust, even more education has to be done.  Citizens and policy makers have to hear the real story - overenthusiastic, hype, sound bite science that oversimplifies - will just increase the distrust of new technology.
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